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from neighboring countries were equally discouraging.
But in southern Africa, and particularly in Zimbabwe,
the huge animals still prospered in great numbers. Here,
I felt, I could encounter the wild elephant unthreatened
by human greed and violence.
But Zimbabwe, I soon discovered, was not a
Peaceable Kingdom. Elephants had grown so abundant
in past years that their numbers had been reduced by
systematic culling. The practice of culling began as early
as 1965, when Zimbabwe was still called Southern
Rhodesia, and has since become an established practice
(Martin and Conybeare 7). This culling process, from
my perspective, is as brutal as poaching, although park
authorities claim it is done as humanely as possible. In
culling elephants, the matriarch is shot ftrst. Elephant
families, composed of females and the young of both
sexes, are led by older females, on whose accumulated
wisdom of waterholes, food sources and incipient
dangers the entire family depends. When the matriarch
is shot, the family is thrown into confusion, and can be
rapidly decimated. Douglas Chadwick, in The Fate of
the Elephant, reports that in one incident, three
professional hunters were able to kill ninety-eight
elephants in one minute (431). Only calves, between
one and three years, young enough not to be traumatized
by the slaughter of their families, are spared; afterwards
they are sold to zoos (Moss 229). One rationale for
shooting entire families is that "dead men tell no tales."

I.
I ftred a third time. That was the shot that did
for him. You could see the agony of it jolt his
whole body and knock the last remnant of
strength from his legs. But in falling he seemed
for the moment to rise, for as his hind legs
collapsed beneath him, he seemed to tower
upward like a huge rock toppling, his trunk
reaching skyward like a tree. He trumpeted,
for the ftrst and only time. And then down he
came, his belly toward me, with a crash that
seemed to shake the ground even where I lay.
George Orwell
"Shooting an Elephant"
I went to southern Africa to see the wild elephant. Of
course, during my journey there were other matters of
concern. But my underlying purpose was to encounter
these giants directly, face to face. I was spurred on in
this purpose by dismay, by an awareness of the
calamitous decline of the elephant in East Africa. In
the last few decades, Kenya had lost over 100,000
elephants to poachers (David Western speech). Reports
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interesting is not scenery but rather an abundance of
animals and birds. On reflection, I concluded that I
certainly would not make the journey to Africa to see
the mopane or the baobab tree, but I did indeed travel
there to see the wild elephant.
At first, the ecological argument seemed to me far
more cogent. Since population pressures have forced
more and more elephants into confined areas, they are
causing great environmental stress because of their
excessive numbers. I had in the past accepted the
culling of deer in order to preserve suburban forest
preserves. Whey then am I so troubled about the
shooting of elephants in Zimbabwe? After all, are there
not strong parallels here with the Land Ethic of AIdo
Leopold? Did not Leopold call for the preservation of
the integrity, stability and beauty of the land? (Leopold
262) Weren't the Zimbabwe national park officials
merely putting Leopold's ideas in practice? Any doubts
I may have had about this parallel to Leopold were
dispelled in a conversation with Dr. R. D. Taylor,
ecologist for the World Wide Fund for Nature in Harare.
Taylor remarked that AIdo Leopold was one of his
personal heroes, and that the wildlife management
practices in Zimbabwe were consistent with Leopold's
principles (Taylor interview).
It was Pascal who said that the heart has reasons the
mind knows not of. Perhaps this aphorism was all too
appropriate for me. I fully grasped on a cognitive level
the cogency of the argument for preserving biodiversity.
I clearly understood no animal can prosper if it destroys
its own habitat and that of other species. Yet I found I
could not resign myself to the idea of culling elephants.
It became clear that my trip into Africa was not just a
physical journey, nor was it that kind of adventure that
expands one's horizons and broadens one's vision of
the world. Rather, I began to understand I was on a sort
of intellectual journey, in which I was being forced to
question some of my fundamental notions about the
role of humans in the natural world.

If there are no survivors, consternation about the
slaughter will not spread to the general population of
elephants. But even park authorities point out that the
recently discovered phenomenon of infrasound
undercuts this rationale. Joyce, Payne has discovered
that elephants communicate at frequencies lower than
the human ear can distinguish, and these frequencies
can travel up to six miles (Martin and Conybeare 35).
All this suggests that elephants, even those not marked
for slaughter, are aware of the process, often come to
investigate the killings (Chadwick 432), and avoid
waterholes during daylight hours after a culling has
taken place there (Martin and Conybeare 35).
There are several reasons put forth for culling in
Zimbabwe. R. D. Taylor and D. H. M. Cumming argue
that culling elephants must be seen against the "regional
background of widespread deforestation and land
degradation" (14). The elephants' proclivity for tearing
down and devouring trees has brought him into this
disrepute. Hwange National Park shows considerable
degradation around waterholes. And zambesi National
Park evidences mopane trees with missing tops and
downed baobabs, damage attributed to elephants. This
damage, it is argued, could very well affect other species
dependent on forest habitats, thus adversely affecting
biodiversity in the parks (Martin and Conybeare 27).
Another argument in favor of culling is raised by
Martin and Conybeare. "The primary reason given here
for selecting 'culling' as the option is aesthetic. We wish
to see Zimbabwe's national heritage of national (sic)
ecosystems within the Parks and Wildlife Estates
preserved in the pristine state in which they existed
fIfteen years ago" (x). The same authors speak of the
"alarming loss of mature trees" and the possible decline
of "savana and forest species" (5) as ajustification for
the shooting of elephants, but they state unequivocally
that "the matter of elephant culling finally falls under
the heading of an aesthetic decision" (3). Again they
say, "elephant densities have caused an aesthetically
unpleasing loss of woodlands" (27).
There are two arguments being presented here, one
ecological and the other aesthetic. I fmd I have very
strong reservations about the second reason. "The scenic
qualities of the landscape" (Martin and Conybeare 3)
for which elephants were being shot do not seem readily
apparent to me. The landscape in Hwange and much of
zambesi National Park consists of scrub woodlands on
mostly flattish terrain, and strikes many observers as
dull and monotonous. What makes the parks so
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n.
Intellectual perplexity can be likened to descending
darkness, or fog, or stonny weather, or some other apt
metaphor. For some, clarity comes in a flash of
inspiration. For others, like me, it is more a process of
muddling through, of groping one's way towards an
impending dawn. Thus it was only gradually, in the
midst of my journey into Africa, that I began to
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understand why shooting elephants in Zimbabwe caused
me such disquiet.
One cause of my uneasiness, I discovered, is the
apparent commercial attitude found in the wildlife
management practices in Zimbabwe. Outside of the
parks, wild animals are regarded as akin to maize and
tobacco; they can be "harvested," "cropped," or "culled"
like any commercial commodity. Following this
agricultural metaphor, wildlife can be regarded as a
sustainable crop; in this way, animals can and should
pay their own way. This submerged metaphor informs
the praiseworthy CAMPFIRE program, whereby people
living in communal lands are given the right to manage
wildlife on their lands. By making a small percentage
of wild animals available for safari hunting, communal
peoples can acquire yearly profits from wealthy hunters
willing to spend in excess of $50,000 U.S. for the
opportunity to shoot trophy animals (Chadwick 440).
But even protected elephants in national parks, when
they are culled, can yield profits. Meat. hides and ivory
have commercial value. Especially ivory. This was a
major reason why Zimbabwe vigorously opposed the
CITES agreement of 1989, by which an overwhehning
majority ofnations agreed to ban the international ivory
trade (Bonner 157). The CITES ban may have saved
the East African elephant from extinction, as David
Western, head of the Kenya Wildlife Service, claimed
in a speech in Harare. But since ivory can no longer be
sold on the international market. in Zimbabwe it meant
that the elephant is no longer paying his way.
It is notjust this commercial attitude toward wildlife
that I fmd disturbing. There is something else even more
fundamental underlying this attitude, a presumption
about nature that is profoundly anthropocentric. Wildlife
has only extrinsic value; it should be used for human
benefit. As Taylor and Cumming phrase it. "Wildlife
should be used sustainably...in the service of man" (1).
Thus the elephant should be used for its meat. hide and
ivory. It should be valued for its contribution to tourism
"in the service of man." But it does not have intrinsic
value; for Taylor and Cumming, it is not valued for its
own sake. As the ecohistorian Robert Delort puts it,
the elephant in Asia is revered as the god Ganesha,
but in Africa it is generally regarded as "a mountain
of meat" (69).
And so these thoughts percolated in my consciousness as I fmally setout to see the elephants themselves,
first at Hwange National Park, where they are overly
abundant at waterholes, and then at Zambesi National
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Park. At Hwange, in particular, I felt a deep uneasiness.
Park officials believe there are simply too many
elephants there. I encountered a wide range ofestimates,
from 22,000 to 40,000, but the most commonly
mentioned estimate is around 35,000 elephants. This
is three times greater than what is believed to be the
carrying capacity of the park. Culling has not taken
place for a few years now, but clearly the pressures
for again shooting elephants in Zimbabwe is growing.
Rumors abound about cullings that were anticipated and
then postponed. Any number of people I spoke with
said something must be done about all these elephants.
And in the past. that which has been done has been
shooting them.
What was it about these creatures that caused me so
much concern? When I finally encountered them in the
wild, I began to gain some insight into my uneasiness.
Perhaps one could call it a kind of recognition, such as
some people experience in their encounters with whales
and dolphins. I recognized in the wild elephant a fellow
creature, an intelligent and curious being whose
behavior was not so distant from my own. Like Seneca,
I realized that this creature had "a fellowship with the
human race." (qtd in Deport 89) I already knew that,
like human behavior, much elephant behavior is learned,
and this learned behavior reveals a remarkable
intelligence. Chadwick gives many instances of
elephant intelligence. In one example, he tells ofAsian
work elephants who were forced to wear a bell in order
to reveal their whereabouts after a night of foraging.
These clever animals learned to stuff their bells with
mud in order to escape detection and extend their
foraging time (289). Cynthia Moss, whose study of the
Amboseli elephants spans more than twenty years,
records the deep and affectionate bonds that pervade
matriarchal families. She describes the elaborate
greeting ceremony involving the intertwining of trunks,
and records their evidentjoy when family members are
united after even a short separation (102, 105). Calves,
according to Moss, are regarded with great concern by
the females of the family, and are raised in a caring
environment. Oddly, elephant family structure bears
more evident similarity to the African communal
extended family than to the American dysfunctional one.
Moss points out a similarity to human feelings, claiming
she has seen elephants evidence playfulness, terror and
even silliness (65). Chadwick reports that captive
elephants have been known to weep under stress (327).
Of course some may worry about anthropomorphism
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in this kind of talk about elephants, fearing that human
feelings are being read into animal behaviors. But
perhaps the only way to fully enter into the life of
intelligent and sentient animals is to make the leap, as
Moss does, from observable animal behavior to
obvious parallels in human experience. Not only must
one think like a mountain, as Leopold said, but here,
to understand elephant behavior, perhaps one must
think like an elephant.
There is one elephant behavior, however, that Moss
and other field observers have recorded as being
haunting and uncanny. When an elephant dies, other
elephants will often remain with it for hours and even
days (Moss 278). Often they attempt to bury the dead
elephant with branches and debris (Chadwick 121).
Sometimes they return to the skeleton of the dead animal
and touch the bones and tusks in a lingering manner
(Moss 235). What is transpiring in the minds of these
giants at these times? Most observers hesitate to offer
an explanation. Whatever may be happening, this
behavior suggests that elephants are feeling creatures
who have some sort of awareness of death.
Given what we know about these intelligent animals,
how then can we continue to treat them as commodities,
having only extrinsic worth? How can we continue to
value them only for their meat, hide, ivory, and capacity
to amuse tourists? These elephants are clearly
intelligent, feeling creatures. Like humans, they must
learn from experience, and in this sense can be said to
acquire wisdom. There may be truth in the idea of the
wise old elephant. They have a form of communication,
inaudible to human ears. They develop strong family
bonds, show affection toward one another, and evidence
great concern for their young. They even have some
sort of an awareness of death. They have in simpler
form many of the behaviors we value in humans, and
which are often said to give humans intrinsic worth. If
humans are valued for their own sakes for these reasons,
then on what grounds can intrinsic worth be denied in
elephants? They should indeed be valued for their own
sakes, not because their bodies can yield carved ivory
and elephant foot umbrella stands "in the service of
man." These giants have a right, or at least an interest,
to live and flourish within the limits of nature.

anxiety that the shooting of elephants would resume
And if it did resume, I believe it would be lamentable,
since these giants are, in my estimation, creatures
possessing intrinsic worth because they are in so many
ways similar to humans. Chadwick, in fact, raises this
issue in The Fate of the Elephant. Discussing the
similarity of emotions and social relationships between
species, he remarks, "If a continuum exists between us
and such beings in terms of anatomy, physiology, social
behavior and intelligence, it follows that there should
be some continuum of moral standards" (475). Of
course, it was Peter Singer who argued for such a
continuum of moral standards in Animal Liberation,
although he did stress sentience rather than intrinsic
worth. Nonetheless, if one applies Singer's arguments
to elephants rather than to laboratory or factory farm
animals, one could argue that elephants deserve to be
treated with the same moral consideration we would
accord humans who are at comparable mental level
(Singer 22). Chadwick points out that the mental level
of elephants is comparable to that of these humans
when he states that a "surprising number of handlers
compared working with elephants to working with
mentally handicapped people" (17). We would think
it horrendous to cull mentally handicapped humans in
order to reduce the pressure of the human species on
the natural environment. How then can we justify
culling elephants, who are at a comparable mental level?
Reflections such as these underscore Cynthia Moss's
feelings. She expresses her fears powerfully: "And if
the poachers do not come, what of the cullers? 1 feel
sick when I think of a team of marksmen, skinners and
butchers moving into Amboseli and slaughtering whole
families along with all their knowledge, their traditions,
and their memories" (278).
Of course, to those who practice aggressive
wildlife management, the answer to this question is
patently obvious. The mentally handicapped do not
inflict extensive damage on the natural environment,
while elephants do. The questions of land degradation
and threatened biodiversity, they would reply, still
remain unanswered.
Ultimately, I would have to reply that I would prefer
to let nature take its course rather than see the shooting
of elephants in Zimbabwe resume. Delayed birth,
drought, even starvation will doubtless bring the
elephant into equilibrium with its habitat. Of course,
the price may be high. Elephants might convert much
of the forest into savannas, as they have in the past.

m.
What then did I learn from this intellectual journey into
Africa? Clearly I came away from Zimbabwe with much
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Forest species may decline as grassland species expand.
The "loss of entire woodlands and loss of valuable
species" may occur, as Martin and Conybeare fear (5).
At what point such degradation would occur is,
however, unknown. Ecology is a young science, and
perhaps not yet adequately developed to predict
precisely what would happen if there were no shooting
of elephants. Taylor and Cumming claim that
"authorities argue that elephants may take systems
across thresholds that cannot be recovered... however,
neither the threshold nor whether the change is
irreversible is known" (14). Moss questions the wisdom
of culling, calling it "a drastic, unreasoned step, given
our present lack of knowledge of ecosystem dynamics"
(271). Western, faced with the overpopulation of
elephants in Amboseli, said the choice is to cull or to
move, and unequivocally advocated translocation of the
giants as an alternative to shooting them (speech).
When elephants and trees come in conflict,
authorities disagree radically. And when the fmal result
of shooting elephants is uncertain, when it is a matter
of dispute among ecologists, perhaps it is time to avoid
violent and aggressive solutions until greater understanding of ecosystems, over time, is achieved. That is
to say, perhaps it is better at this time to just let nature
be. What I am advocating here is a more modest and
less violent attitude toward nature in general and toward
elephants in particular. Perhaps it is an act of human
hubris to assume that humans know what is best for
nature, and perhaps it is an act of arrogance to promote
a violent solution when the outcome of one's actions is
uncertain and disputable.
The need for modesty and nonviolence was brought
home to me on a personal level by my last encounter
with the giants. I was on foot, following the shoreline
of the zambesi River, looking for birds, and not even
thinking about elephants. Without any warning, I found
myself confronting two massive bulls that suddenly
emerged in the foliage. Although I was only one hundred
paces from these huge creatures, I did not feel I was in
any danger, since they regarded me with considerable
indifference. Without an elephant gun, without a safari
van to escape in, without even enough presence of mind
to use my camera, I stood there, defenseless and
vulnerable. I realized, confronted by these magnificent
animals, that my place in the natural scheme of things
was indeed modest. Standing there, I could no longer
think anthropocentrically, imagining myself as the
<:enter of nature, with the power of life and death over
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these creatures. Of course I did admire these giants for
their human-like qualities, for their intelligence, their
playfulness, their affectionate natures, their evident
conscious awareness. But I was beginning to suspect
that these characteristics were not uniquely human but
rather part of a common inheritance we shared with
other members of the animal kingdom. The point was
not that they were like us. No, the point was that we
were like them.
An anthropocentric perspective had distorted my
view of animals in the past. But this intellectual
journey into Africa had indeed transformed my view
of nature. I was beginning to think ecocentrically, in a
nature-centered way. The elephants had taught me on
the level of lived experience something I had learned
theoretically from Aldo Leopold years ago. I was not
the master of nature; rather I was, and should be, a
mere citizen.
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